Surveys of Recent Developments in Third Circuit Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting
changes in significant areas of practice.
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NEGLIGENCE -

DuTY OF CARE OWED TO A TRESPASSER - A
POSSESSOR OF LAND AND AN ELECrRICrTY SUPPLIER OWE A DUTY TO A
TRESPASSER ONLY TO REFRAIN FROM WANTON OR WILLFUL
MISCONDUCT - Estate of Zimmerman v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
168 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 1999).

On August 6, 1994, twenty-three-year-old Aaron Zimmerman
climbed a concrete wall and metal fence to gain entry to an area
where commuter trains travel in the city of Philadelphia (City),
Pennsylvania. See Estate of Zimmerman v. SoutheasternPa. Transp. Auth.,
168 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 1999). When Zimmerman reached the
top, he sat on a catenary crossbar where he received a fatal electrical
shock. A catenary is a collection of electric wires on a massive steel
framework. Wires adjoin the catenaries and carry the high-voltage
electricity needed to power the trains.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
possessed and controlled the track area, including the catenary, and
Amtrak, another passenger railroad corporation, supplied the
electricity that caused Zimmerman's demise.
Consolidated Rail
Corporation (Conrail) used the tracks. See id. at 685. Signs stating
"Danger: Live Wire" and "Keep Off' were posted about the track
area. See id. at 684. Although unauthorized persons regularly
entered the track area, Zimmerman was the first person actually
known to climb the catenary. See id. at 684, 686. SEPTA employed
police officers to eject trespassers from the track area. See id. at 686.
Two years after the incident, Zimmerman's administratrix, along
with Zimmerman's mother, filed a wrongful death and survival suit
against SEPTA, Amtrak, the City, and Conrail with the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania. See id. at 683.
Amtrak, as a federally chartered corporation, successfully asserted
federal question jurisdiction and removed the matter to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, See id. at 684. The court found that the decedent was a
trespasser, and, thus, SEPTA was not liable for his death because
SEPTA did not act wantonly or willfully. See id. The district court
noted that no exception to this standard applied. See id. Further, the
judge determined that the City and Conrail were not liable because
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neither possessed the land. See id. After finding that Amtrak did. not
possess the track area or the catenary, the court held that Amtrak, as
an electricity provider, owed no duty of care because Zimmerman did
not lawfully come into contact with the electricity. See id.
The Third Circuit, in a unanimous opinion by Judge Rosenn,
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that a possessor of land
and an electricity supplier owe only a duty to refrain from willful or
wanton misconduct to a -trespasser. See id. at 688. Furthermore, the
court found that neither Amtrak nor SEPTA were engaged in such
conduct. See id. The court's review of the district court's decision was
plenary. See id. at 684. Judge Rosenn initially noted that the
plaintiffs' survival and wrongful death actions were founded on a
negligence theory. See id. Therefore, the judge carefully outlined the
elements that the plaintiffs must prove in order to survive summary
judgment. See id. The court explained that the plaintiffs must prove
(1) that the defendants owed a duty of care to Zimmerman, (2) the
defendants breached that duty, (3) a causal connection between the
resulting injury and the defendants' breach existed, and (4) that
Zimmerman was injured. See id.
The court commenced the analysis by deciding which
defendants owed a duty of care to Zimmerman. See id. The court
stated that a possessor of land owes a duty to protect persons against
known dangerous conditions. See id. (citing Blackman v. FederalRealty
Inv. Trust, 664 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). The judge
additionally noted that a possessor occupies land with the intention
to control it. See id. (citing Bloom v. Waste Management Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 1002, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
The court decided that
uncontested evidence suggested that SEPTA was the exclusive
possessor of the land; thus, only SEPTA owed the decedent a duty of
care. See id. at 685. Conrail's purported use of the tracks did not,
according to Judge Rosenn, equate with possession. See id. The court
also stated that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the City's
ownership. See id. Likewise, the court did not find any evidence in
the record to suggest that Amtrak controlled or possessed the land.
See id. Nevertheless, the court found that Amtrak owed the decedent
a duty of care because Amtrak was an electrical supplier. See id.
Judge Rosenn explained that electricity suppliers owe a duty to all
persons in proximity to the high-voltage electrical wires, but that the
degree of care fluctuates with the situation of the injured party on the
land. See id. (citing Heller v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 576 F. Supp. 6, 12
n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1983)). Despite
Amtrak's disagreement, the court maintained that electricity
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suppliers even owe a duty of care to avoid willful and wanton injury to
trespassers. See id.
Having concluded that both Amtrak and SEPTA owed the
decedent a duty of care, the court demarcated the extent of that duty.
See id. The court stressed that the degree of care that Amtrak and
SEPTA owed depended upon Zimmerman's status on the track area.
See id. In order to determine whether Zimmerman was a licensee or
trespasser, the court took notice of the respective definitions of the
terms. See id. The court observed that a trespasser is one who,
without the privilege to do so, enters or remains on land that is
possessed by another. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §
329 (1965)). Conversely, a licensee, the court noted, is a person who
has the possessor's consent to enter or remain upon his land. See id.
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 (1965)). The court held
that there was no genuine dispute of the material fact that
Zimmerman was a trespasser. See id. at 687.
The court chided the plaintiffs' argument that Zimmerman was
a licensee and had implied consent to be in the track area because he
and other homeless persons were permitted to enter and remain
upon the land. See id. at 685-86. The court opined that this line of
reasoning would change every foreseeable trespasser's status into that
of a licensee. See id. at 686. The court insisted that a foreseeable
trespasser is a trespasser nonetheless and that mere acquiescence to
trespassing does not alter an entrant's status. See id. Furthermore,
the court assumed that even if there was implied consent, the
plaintiffs themselves had presented evidence that SEPTA, the
possessor of the land, did not accede to the presence of trespassers.
See id. In reviewing such evidence, the court recognized that SEPTA
utilized police officers to remove unauthorized persons from the
premises. See id.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to employ the
permissive crossing doctrine. See id. Judge Rosenn explained that a
permissive crossing is an implied or express license to pass over
another's property. See id. (citing Henry v. Pennsylvania R.t. Co., 84
A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. 1951)). The court further noted that the crossing
must be limited to well-defined areas, and the public must use the
crossing notoriously, continuously, and frequently. See id. The court
found that the permissive crossing doctrine was inapplicable despite
plaintiffs' contention that a causeway existed that enabled access to
the track area. See id. Judge Rosenn explained that the people, such
as Zimmerman, who entered the land without express permission did
not simply pass over the track area to reach the other side. See id.
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Rather, the court noted that these persons remained on the land for
substantial periods of time. See id. Thus, Judge Rosenn concluded
that this doctrine did not render the decedent an implied licensee.
See id. Further, the court assumed that, even if Zimmerman had
obtained implied consent to enter and remain on the land, plaintiffs
offered no evidence that the possessor consented to allow
Zimmerman to climb up and perch atop the catenary. See id. at 687.
Next, the court explained that because Zimmerman was a
trespasser, the plaintiffs must show that Amtrak or SEPTA committed
willful or wanton negligence or misconduct. See id. Judge Rosenn
rejected both of the plaintiffs' assertions that a higher standard of
care should apply. See id. First, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts the
defendants' standard of care should be heightened because the
catenary is a highly dangerous artificial condition that was
encountered by a foreseeable trespasser. See id. (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 337 (1965)). Pennsylvania had not, according to
the court, adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second)
pertaining to artificial conditions, and under Pennsylvania law,
artificial conditions do not engender heightened duty to foreseeable
trespassers. See id. Even assuming that Pennsylvania adopted the
approach of the Restatement (Second), Judge Rosenn speculated
that the conditions of the Restatement (Second) would not be
fulfilled because SEPTA had no reason to believe that a trespasser
could not appreciate the risk of the activity or discover the dangerous
condition. See id.
Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that Amtrak
and SEPTA were subject to a heightened degree of care because the
See id.
high-voltage wires were a dangerous instrumentality.
Generally the possessor of land or an electricity supplier owes a
heightened duty under these circumstances, but the court clarified
that this duty extends only to those persons lawfully in proximity to
the high-voltage wires. See id. The court reasoned that Amtrak and
SEPTA did not owe Zimmerman this heightened duty because he was
a trespasser. See id.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the childtrespasser exception was applicable because the decedent suffered
from the effects of bipolar disorder and, hence, could not
comprehend entirely the hazard he faced. See id. at 687-88. Judge
Rosenn noted that this exception, known as the doctrine of attractive
nuisances, is restricted to situations in which a child unlawfully enters
or remains on land. See id. at 688. The court remarked that
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possessors and owners of land do not owe a higher duty of care to
protect adults with emotional disorders from injury. See id. Even so,
the court noted that the plaintiffs did not present evidence that the
decedent had a diminished capacity to realize danger. See id.
The court subsequently examined whether SEPTA and Amtrak
had breached their duty to refrain from wanton or willful
misconduct. See id. The court explained that wanton or willful
misconduct is an intentional and unreasonable act that is committed
with disregard for a known and obvious risk and that is highly likely
to result in harm. See id. The court found that Amtrak did not
breach its duty of care to Zimmerman and that the plaintiffs
presented no evidence that Amtrak committed a wanton or willful act
with regard to its role as an electricity supplier. See id. Further, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' two arguments that SEPTA committed
wanton misconduct. See id. First, the plaintiffs contended that
SEPTA posted inadequate warning signs concerning the dangers of
the electrical wires, despite regular trespassing in the track area. See
id. The court found that SEPTA did not have knowledge that persons
climbed the catenary structure and further noted that the plaintiffs
did not present any evidence that anyone else had climbed the
structure. See id. Thus, the court concluded that the chance of
electrocution from scaling the catenary was not so great as to require
additional warning signs. See id. The court also rejected the
argument that knowledge of a general risk imputes knowledge of a
specific risk. See id. The court reasoned that SEPTA's knowledge that
unauthorized persons entered and stayed in the track area did not
equate with knowledge that a person would climb the catenary
structure, take a seat, and electrocute himself. ' See id.
Second, the plaintiffs argued that SEPTA committed wanton or
willful misconduct when it re-energized the circuit after the decedent
had tripped it. See id. The court, however, observed that these
circuits get tripped regularly and that the risk of harm created by reenergizing them was low. See id. Judge Rosenn explained that at the
time that the SEPTA employee re-energized the circuit, he had no
reason to believe that a human, rather than an animal, had tripped
the circuit. See id. The court also noted that Zimmerman was
electrocuted prior to the restoration of power. See id.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine could be used to prove wanton or willful
misconduct. See id. The court defined res ipsa loquitur as a
shorthand phrase for circumstantial proof of negligence. See id. The
court explained that in order for this theory to survive summary
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judgment, the plaintiffs must show (1) that the event at issue does
not typically occur without negligence, (2) that the evidence
sufficiently eliminated other possible causes of the event, and (3) that
the negligence is within the parameters of the defendants' duty to the
plaintiffs. See id. (quoting Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 100
(Pa. 1974);. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1965)). Judge
Rosenn thereupon declined to decide whether the doctrine was
applicable to torts purportedly committed against trespassers such as
Zimmerman because the plaintiffs had failed to establish every
element of the doctrine. See id.
The court noted that the evidence did not eliminate the
possibility that the decedent's own conduct had caused his death,
and, thus, the second element could not be established. See id. The
judge contended that Zimmerman should have known that he was
courting danger. See id. The court surmised that a reasonable person
would have realized that electrical wires running above train tracks
pose a serious danger. See id. The court also found that the plaintiffs
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the third element.
See id. According to the court, no reasonable fact finder could
determine that either SEPTA or Amtrak engaged in wanton or willful
conduct by either intentionally injuring the decedent or disregarding
a known grave risk. See id.
Fortunately, Pennsylvania state law provides that a possessor of
land and an electricity supplier merely owe a duty to refrain from
wanton or willful misconduct to a trespasser. This allowed the Third
Circuit to recognize the social principle that a person who takes an
extreme risk is essentially responsible for his own actions. The
court's stern warning must be spread, so as to warn members of
society that "deep pocket" defendants will not pay for a person's
perilous indiscretions.
The Third Circuit's message also should reach the legal
community. With the law clear on this subject, attorneys should
decline to file this type of meritless personal injury suit, especially
when the requisite wanton or willful conduct of the defendant clearly
is absent. This breed of frivolous lawsuit only congests the court's
docket and diverts the legal system's attention and resources from
cases more deserving of our courts' scrutiny.
Grace Najarian

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE FORBIDS POLICE DEPARTMENTS TO DISCIPLINE OFFICERS WHO
WEAR BEARDS FOR

RELIGIOUS REASONS

WHEN

OTHER SECULAR

REASONS FOR WEARING BEARDS ALREADY MERIT EXEMPTIVE STATUS

-

FraternalOrder of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5004 (U.S. Oct. 4,

1999).
During the course of their service in the Newark Police
Department, Officers Shakoor Mustafa and Faruq Abdul-Aziz, both
devout Sunni Muslims, were questioned by department officials
regarding their failure to comply with Order 71-15, a long-standing
internal order prohibiting officers from wearing beards or any other
facial hair beneath the lower lip. See FraternalOrder of Police Newark
Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5004 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999). Officers Mustafa
and Aziz advised the officials that they wore their beards because of a
Sunni Muslim belief that the failure to wear one constitutes a major
sin as grievous as the consumption of pork. Likewise, Officers
Mustafa and Aziz informed the officials that Sunni Muslims are not
exonerated from the sin, even if it stems from the instruction of an
employer. See id. at 360-61.
Following this questioning, Officers Mustafa and Aziz received
individual notices from officials in the Newark Police Department
informing them that, despite their proffered religious reasons for
wearing beards, continued disobedience of the oral command to
shave might warrant their removal from the police force. See id. at
361. Shortly thereafter, on January 24, 1997, the Newark Police
Department declared its intent to enforce a "Zero Tolerance" policy
against those officers who did not comply with Order 71-15 and had
no medical excuse that would justify wearing a beard.
In its
aggressive enforcement of this "Zero Tolerance" policy, the
department scheduled a disciplinary hearing for Officers Mustafa and
Aziz to take place in May 1997.
Prior to the scheduled hearings, Officers Mustafa and Aziz filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey against the city of Newark as well as the Newark Police
Department, its police chief, and its director, seeking injunctive relief

397

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:397

from the police department's enforcement of Order 71-15. See id. at
361. The officers claimed that the department's enforcement of this
policy violated their constitutional right to freely exercise their
religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id. The district
court agreed, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and
granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. See id.
Consequently, the district court issued a permanent injunction
preventing any of the defendants "from disciplining or otherwise
disadvantaging Plaintiffs Aziz and Mustafa for violating Order 71-15
or any other directive which would require them to shave or trim
their beards in violation of their religious beliefs." Id. (citations
omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's order forbidding the defendants to
discipline Officers Aziz and Mustafa for their religiously motivated
noncompliance with Order 71-15. See id. at 360. The Court of
Appeals held that, because the Newark Police Department made
exemptions from its no-beard policy for secular, medical reasons and
because it did not offer any compelling justification for its
unwillingness to allow exemptive status to those who wear beards for
religious reasons, the department's policy violated Officers Aziz and
Mustafa's First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion. See
id.
Judge Alito, writing for a unanimous panel, commenced the
opinion with a survey of the law with respect to the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, as made applicable to the several
states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 361 (citing Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)). The court stated that the
United States Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to compel the government to provide religious
exemptions from any neutral, generally applicable law that
incidentally imposes a substantial burden on religious conduct. See
id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)). Judge Alito
clarified that under this approach a government could successfully
defend its refusal to provide such religious exemptions, but it would
have to survive "strict scrutiny" in so doing. See id. (citing Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)). The
judge then stated that the Supreme Court grew to have doubts about
the breadth of its jurisprudence regarding the "exemption" approach
to the Free Exercise Clause and its accompanying insurmountable
"strict scrutiny" standard of review of governmental conduct. See id.
at 361-62 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703-08 (1986)). Judge
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Alito explained that the Supreme Court later reduced its standard of
review from "strict scrutiny" to "rational basis" in instances in which
an individual objects to "'a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' Id. at 362
(quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 879 (1990)). The court carefully noted, however, that the Smith
Court did not overrule any of its prior decisions that dealt with the
Free Exercise Clause, and instead merely distinguished them. See id.
at 363 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-84).
Having surveyed the law and established "rational basis" as the
default standard of review in free exercise cases, the court addressed
the specific claims of Officers Aziz and Mustafa. See id. The court
rejected the plaintiffs' first contention that, because their case
involved a noncriminal prohibition by the government, unlike the
criminal prohibition in Smith, their claims merited the application of
a "strict scrutiny" standard. See id. In addition to citing a prior
religious exemption case in which the court had already rejected this
argument, Judge Alito announced two further reasons the court
would not credit the plaintiffs' proposal to limit Smith to cases
involving criminal statutes. See id. at 363-64 (citing Salvation Army v.
Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d Cir. 1990)).
First, the court explained that if the civil/criminal distinction were
utilized, a constitutional anomaly would exist in that a government
would be more hard-pressed to justify regulations that bear mere civil
consequences, such as loss of unemployment benefits or employment
status, than it would be to defend criminal statutes that bear graver
consequences such as imprisonment. See id. at 363. Second, the
court noted that the Supreme Court itself had already dispensed with
this possible interpretation of Smith when the Court decided a later
religious exemption case without ever discussing the possibility of the
civil/criminal distinction. See id. at 364 (citing City of Boerne v. Fores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
Having rejected the plaintiffs' first argument, the court then
addressed the plaintiffs' second argument that the police
department's secular exemptions to its no-beard policy justifies the
use of "strict scrutiny" of the department's reasons for refusing to
grant religious exemptions. See id. In analyzing this argument, the
court first referred to Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, in which the Supreme Court applied "strict scrutiny" to
invalidate an ordinance that prescribed punishment for persons who
unnecessarily kill animals. See id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu
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Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993)). The court
explained that the addition to the ordinance of an implied
exemption for "necessary" slaughters required heightened scrutiny,
because enforcement of the ordinance against members of the
Santeria religion for their ritual slaughter of animals improperly
devalued their religious reasons for the killings and singled them out
for discriminatory treatment. See id. (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537).
Judge Alito emphasized that the Lukumi Court's decision to apply
"strict scrutiny" to the ordinance is consistent with the outcomes of
pre-Smith cases in which quitting one's job for "good cause" provided
a mechanism for an "individualized exemption" from a statutorily
prescribed ineligibility to receive unemployment compensation
benefits. See id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). The judge then
explained that in all of the cases in which a system of "individualized
exemptions" existed, the Supreme Court would not uphold the
government's refusal to broaden such a system to include religious
reasons unless the government's reasons survived "strict scrutiny." See
id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
After the court's review of the law supporting the "individualized
exemption" exception to the Smith rule, Judge Alito found that the
police department's decision to provide exemptions from its nobeard policy for medical, but not religious, reasons was rooted in the
impermissible devaluation of the religious convictions of Officers Aziz
and Mustafa such that they were judged "to be of less import than
medical reasons."
Id. at 365.
The court reasoned that the
department's decision constituted significant evidence of an intent to
discriminate against the officers, and consequently, application of
"strict scrutiny" was triggered. See id.
In deciding to apply the "individualized exemption" exception,
the court rejected three grounds argued by the defendants against
the imposition of the exception. See id. at 365-66. First, in rejecting
the department's claim that its medical exemptions stemmed from a
duty to comply with the "reasonable accommodations" aspect of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b) (5) (A) (West
1994), and not from an impermissible value judgment, the court
referenced the parallel requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (West 1994), to provide "reasonable
accommodations" to religion as an equally important legal duty. See
id. at 365. Second, in response to the department's claim that its
medical exemptions were not "individualized" as required by Smith
and Lukumi for the triggering of "strict scrutiny," the court stated that
the fact that an exemption is categorical could only further implicate
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the concern that the government was deciding that a secular
motivation was more significant than a religious motivation. See id.
Finally, the court answered the department's contention that the
medical exemptions to its no-beard policy should not provide the
grounds for a "strict scrutiny" analysis because a medical prescription
exception to the criminal statute in Smith had not triggered such an
analysis. See id. at 365-66. The court responded that, unlike the
prescription exception in Smith that did not subvert a state interest in
restricting the unregulated use of drugs, the decision to allow an
officer to wear a beard for a medical reason did undermine the
State's interest in maintaining uniformity in appearance of officers.
See id. at 366. As such, the court found the medical exemptions
indicative of the police department's impermissible value judgment
that secular reasons for wearing beards, but not religious reasons, are
significant enough to trump the department's interest in uniformity.
See id. The court added that such value judgments must survive "strict
scrutiny." See id.
After deciding that the plaintiffs had shown that the
"individualized exemption" exception should be utilized, the court
applied "strict scrutiny" to the department's no-beard policy. See id.
at 366. The court summarily rejected as less than compelling each of
the department's four proffered justifications for the plan. See id. at
366-67. Addressing each of the four proffered reasons in the same
fashion, the court exclaimed that the city's interests in the
identifiability of its officers, the safety of its streets, the morale of its
police force, and the public's confidence in police officers could not
possibly be furthered by the exclusion of officers who wear beards for
religious reasons, when officers who wear beards for medical reasons
are already present on the force. See id. Finally, Judge Alito
emphasized that if the department's hidden reason for prohibiting
the wearing of beards for religious reasons was an effort to downplay
differences in religious beliefs and practices that could cause division
in the ranks, the court would have before it "a policy the very purpose
of which is to suppress manifestations of the religious diversity that
the First Amendment safeguards." Id. at 367.
The analysis by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in this case is important for several reasons. First, the decision
has added to the law on the free exercise of religion by clarifying the
rule in Smith and explaining the concept of the "individualized
exemption" exception to this rule. The right to freely exercise one's
religion has maintained so sacred a position in this nation that its
application within the law enforcement community proves crucial.
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Furthermore, this decision should foster an environment within the
police department that is more tolerant of diversity. Not only would
such an environment result in a greater response by minority
communities in filling the ranks of police officers, but also it would
result in greater identification and understanding between the police
force and these communities. Finally, this case stands as a reminder
that those who patrol our streets and guard the rights of citizens need
not surrender the very rights they serve to protect.
Merricj Polloway

AVIATION LAW FEDERAL AVIATION ACT THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT COMPLETELY PREEMPTS THE FIELD OF AVIATION SAFETY,

BUT ALLOWS FOR STATE AND TERRITORIAL REMEDIES FOR A VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL STANDARDS - Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
363 (3d Cir. 1999).
On August 28, 1991, plaintiffs Khaled Abdullah, Audrey James,
Eardley James, and Velma George were passengers on an American
Airlines flight that originated in New York and was bound for Puerto
Rico. See Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir.
1999). While airborne, the First Officer noticed a weather system
forming in the flight path. Upon this observation, the flight crew
illuminated the "fasten seat belts" sign. At this time, the First Officer
also warned the flight attendants that the aircraft would encounter
some turbulence in approximately ten minutes. At no time did the
flight crew warn the passengers of the turbulence ahead, nor did the
pilot change the flight course to avoid the oncoming weather system.
See id. at 365. Some passengers were injured when the plane
encountered the severe weather and turbulence. Of those injured,
some were wearing their seat belts, and others were not. The
plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits against American Airlines based
upon these facts. The lawsuits alleged that the pilot and flight crew
negligently failed to take precautions to avoid the turbulence and
negligently failed to warn the passengers of the turbulent conditions
to enable the passengers to take the necessary precautions to protect
themselves.
A jury trial began in August of 1995 in the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, Division of Saint Croix. See id. The court consolidated
the two cases. See id. Upon conclusion of the trial, a jury found
American Airlines liable, with no contributory negligence by the
plaintiffs, and awarded the plaintiffs more than two million dollars.
See id. at 366.
American Airlines filed a post-trial motion asserting that the
District Court improperly relied on the common law of the Virgin
Islands to define the requisite standards of care for the pilots, the
flight crew, and the passengers. See id. The motion argued that the
Federal Aviation Act (FAA) impliedly preempts state regulations on
aviation safety issues and, more specifically, the standards of care for
403
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pilots, flight crews, and passengers. See id. The motion requested
dismissal, or in the alternative, a new trial, attorney's fees, and costs.
See id. The district court held that the FAA does preempt state
aviation regulation and the standards of care applied to pilots, flight
crews, and passengers, but that a person may recover under state or
territorial law for violations of these federal standards. See id. As
such, the court determined that evidence regarding standards of
care, other than the federal standards, had been wrongfully admitted,
and such error warranted a retrial. See id.
The plaintiffs moved for certification of the question of whether
federal law preempts the standards for air safety, yet still preserves the
state or territorial remedies for such violations. See id. at 364. The
Third Circuit granted interlocutory review on both portions of that
certified question. See id. The Third Circuit determined that federal
law preempts state law standards for air safety, but preserves
territorial and state remedies for violations of these federal standards.
See id. at 364-65.
Judge Roth authored the unanimous opinion of the court. See
id. at 364. Judge Roth first determined that the court had proper
jurisdiction over the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See id. at 366. Further, the court noted
that because the questions presented were questions of law, the scope
of review was plenary. See id. Thus, Judge Roth explained that the
court could address any issue included in the certified order because
it is the order, and not the specific question, that is appealable. See id.
(citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996)).
Next, Judge Roth stated that the power of Congress to preempt
federal law is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of
the United States. See id. The judge noted that any Supremacy
Clause analysis must originate with the presumption that Congress
did not intend to supercede state regulation. See id. at 366-67 (citing
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)). The court then explained that
federal preemption of state laws may occur when preemption is
explicitly stated in the statute, when the structure and purpose of the
statute implicitly preempt state law, when state law conflicts with
federal law, or when Congress has completely occupied the field such
that states have no room to regulate further in that area. See id. at
367.
With respect to the FAA, Judge Roth declared, Congress so
thoroughly occupied the field of aviation regulation that the states
have no room to supplement such regulation. See id. The court
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noted that such "field preemption" may occur when federal
regulation is pervasive or when state regulation in the given field
would compromise congressional intent. See id. The court found
that there is federal field preemption in air safety because the FAA
and other related regulations provide a complete scheme of air safety
that does not vary by jurisdiction and is not subject to
supplementation by the separate states and territories.
See id.
Therefore, the court opined that federal law establishes the
applicable standards of care in the field of air safety and, thus,
preempts the entire field from state or territorial regulation. See id.
Although the court determined that the entire field of air safety is
preempted by federal law, Judge Roth indicated that the scope of this
field preemption may be narrowly defined. See id. The court held
that Congress intended to preempt the entire field of air safety, but
allowed plaintiffs to recover damages under state or territorial
remedies. See id. at 367-68.
In determining that aviation safety is completely preempted by
federal law, Judge Roth noted that the court had deviated from prior
lower federal court precedent. See id. at 368. This deviation,
according to Judge Roth, rested on the determination either that the
reasoning of the court in previous decisions was unpersuasive or that
the decision rested upon an inappropriate application of the Airline
Deregulation Act, an economic deregulation statute irrelevant to the
determination of the preemption issue in air safety cases. See id.
In answering the issues certified by the district court, Judge Roth
dedicated significant attention to the legislative history of the FAA.
See id at 368-69. The judge initially highlighted the fact that the FAA
was created in response to a rash of air crashes between civil and
military aircraft adhering to differing sets of flight rules. See id. at
368. In an effort to make air travel safer for all passengers, the court
found that Congress determined that a uniform system of regulation
was necessary. See id. Judge Roth recognized that Congress intended
the FAA to place the sole responsibility for aviation safety in the
hands of the federal government. See id. The judge stated that
Congress provided the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration with broad authority to execute the FAA in a way that
best reduces or eliminates the possibility of air traffic accidents. See
id. at 368-69. To accomplish this directive, the Administrator enacted
a complete set of standards that regulate everything from pilot
certification to flight rules. See id. at 369.
The court then surveyed early federal cases that interpreted the
FAA, concluding that the broad scope of the FAA implies federal
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preemption. See id. at 369-71. Judge Roth first noted that in 1960,
the Second Circuit remarked that the FAA was passed in an effort to
place all authority to regulate America's airspace in one single entity.
See id. at 369 (citing Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892,
894 (2d Cir. 1960)). The court next examined a Supreme Court
decision that relied on the centralization of air safety control as an
indication of congressional intent to preempt the field of air safety.
See id. at 369-70 (citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973)). In addition, the judge explored a Seventh
Circuit case in which the court held that the primary purpose of the
FAA was to centralize power over air safety and to create a single
system of flight regulation. See id. at 370 (citing Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974)). Finally, the court
looked to another Second Circuit case that indicated that a noise
control amendment to the FAA was meant to strengthen the federal
regulatory role in an area in which federal law already completely
preempted state law. See id. (citing British Ainvays Bd. v. Port Auth. of
N.Y, 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Judge Roth next evaluated more recent case law that also
indicated that the FAA completely preempts the field of aviation
safety. See id. at 370-71. Judge Roth referenced a First Circuit
opinion that determined pilot regulation was so related to air safety
that such regulation was federally preempted. See id. (citing French v.
Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989)). In ultimately
concluding that the field of aviation safety is federally preempted, the
court noted the inconsistency that would result if pilot licensing, for
example, were federally preempted, but the very standards necessary
to obtain a license were not. See id. at 371. According to Judge Roth,
this move from preemption of specific aspects of aviation safety to
preemption of general aviation safety is supported by federal
regulations regarding careless or reckless operation of an aircraft. See
id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (1999)). The court noted that these
regulations provide a general standard of care in addition to all of
the specific FAA regulations that exist. See id. Thus, according to the
court, in order to determine the standard of care in an aviation
negligence action, both the specific regulations and the general
standard that an aircraft may not be operated in a careless or reckless
manner must be analyzed. See id. at 371-72.
Next, the court turned its attention to the divergent authority.
See id. at 372. The court first stated that the preemption of certain
aviation fields does not exclude from preemption all other fields in
aviation. See id. at 372-73. The court concluded that because the
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Aviation Deregulation Act (ADA) states that rates, routes, and
services are preempted, it does not necessarily follow that those areas
not expressly stated in the ADA are not preempted. See id. Instead,
in determining if the provisions in the ADA are meant to preempt
other regulations, the judge stated that the court must look to the
language of the ADA and the way that statute relates to the provisions
of the FAA. See id. at 373. The court found that safety does not fall
within the scope of the ADA because Congress intended the ADA to
prevent state regulation from interfering with airline competition,
and because safety is not a factor when choosing the mode of
competition. See id. In addition, Judge Roth suggested that the "one
to the exclusion of all others" maxim applied to this situation because
the FAA and the ADA were passed some twenty years apart. See id.
The court next discounted the determination that, because the
state and federal laws do not conflict, preemption does not exist. See
id. at 373-74. The court noted that because the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration has enacted both specific and
general standards, neither territorial nor state legislatures may
promulgate supplemental regulations.
See id. First, the court
observed that tight federal regulations left no gaps to be filled within
the field of aviation safety. See id. at 374. In addition, Judge Roth
stated that an actual conflict need not exist when Congress intended
the federal statute to occupy the field. See id. In such an instance, the
court declared, any territorial or state statute in that field must yield
to federal authority. See id.
The court additionally stated that the savings and insurance
clauses in the FAA are consistent with the court's determination that
safety regulations are preempted, whereas state remedies for a breach
of those safety standards are not. See id. at 374-75. The court noted
that the clauses allow for any remedy available by law. See id. at 374.
Judge Roth determined that the availability of a territorial or state
remedy does not consequently indicate that there is room for
territorial or state safety standards. See id. at 375. Addressing the
divergent authority, the court discredited the notion that air safety
could not be preempted because it fell under the umbrella of
traditional police powers held by the states. See id. The court pointed
out that whether the states have the ability to exercise their police
power in a certain field depends on whether that field is completely
preempted by federal law. See id. Thus, Judge Roth stated, the court
need not consider whether air safety falls within the traditional police
powers exercised by the states because the field of air safety is
completely preempted. See id.
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In conclusion, the court turned its attention to the federal
preemption of state remedies for violations of federal air safety
standards. See id. The court determined that, with respect to
remedies, the inquiry should not be whether the federal government
has occupied the field of safety, but whether the application of state
remedies would frustrate the purpose of the federal statute. See id.
The court imparted that, in this instance, the state and territorial
remedies must exist because the FAA does not provide for any
specific remedies other than the mandate of insurance, which is
presumably made available under applicable local law to the victims
in an FAA violation. See id. at 375-76.
In AbduUah, the court built a well-reasoned foundation
supported by legislative history and case law. The court persuasively
determined that the FAA completely preempts the field of air safety,
but does not preempt state remedies for violations of such federal
regulations. Indeed, the very language of the FAA seems to indicate
that this is a proper determination.
One troubling aspect remains, however.
If indeed the
Administrator for the Federal Aviation Administration has the
capacity to enact only minimum standards of air safety, then the
states retain authority to enact more stringent regulations. If this
court's interpretation of congressional intent is accurate, Congress
should amend the language of the code to state that the
Administrator is to enact definitive regulations pertaining to air
safety. It stands to reason that all air traffic should be subject to the
same safety standards given that an airplane passes regularly through
the air space of multiple states on a single flight. A patchwork of
regulations could cause undue hardship to airlines and pilots,
especially if states are allowed to enact standards that conform to
federal regulations but conflict with the regulations enacted by other
states.
Justin P. Runke

SETTLEMENT - APPARENT AUTHORITY DOCTRINE - THE THIRD
CIRCUIT PREDICTS THAT THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT WOULD
NOT APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AN
ATrORNEY'S UNAUTHORIZED SETTLEMENT OF A CLIENT'S CLAIM

Farrisv.JC. Penney Co., 176 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1999).
On April 15, 1995, appellant Margaret Farris fell and was injured
at aJ.C. Penney store in Philadelphia. See Farrisv.JC.Penney Co., 176
F.3d 706, 708 (3d Cir. 1999). Farris alleged that she suffered injuries
when store employees falsely accused her of shoplifting and
restrained her. Farris, along with her husband, retained attorney
Timothy Booker as their representative and agreed to a forty percent
contingency fee. Booker filed suit in federal court on November 28,
1995, on behalf of the Farrises.
On September 24, 1996, a bifurcated trial commenced before a
judge and jury. Settlement discussions between the parties began the
next day. After meeting with the Farrises and Booker, the judge met
privately withJ.C. Penney's attorney, Renee Berger. Later that day, in
a meeting with both attorneys, the judge inquired of Berger if J.C.
Penney had authorized her to settle the claim for $20,000. After the
judge assured Berger that $20,000 would settle the case, Berger
obtained the necessary authorization and informed Booker
accordingly. Berger then observed Booker and Margaret Farris enter
a witness room where they stayed for approximately five minutes.
Subsequently, Booker advised Berger that the $20,000 offer was
accepted. Neither of the Farrises, however, had authorized Booker to
accept a $20,000 offer as Margaret Farris had informed Booker that,
until her medical treatment was finished, she did not want to settle
the case. Despite Mrs. Farris's instruction, the $20,000 settlement
agreement was conveyed to the judge, and on the afternoon of
September 25, 1996, Berger and Booker both stated to the court that
the case had been settled for a total of $20,000. The jury was then
summoned and discharged. The in-court proceedings concerning
the settlement, lasted only three minutes. Later, the district court
found that although Mrs. Farris was in the courtroom when the
attorneys discussed the settlement with the judge, she either did not
hear or did not comprehend what was occurring. After the jury was
discharged, Mrs. Farris, in tears, asked Booker why he had settled the
409
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case, to which Booker responded, "One day you'll thank me." Shortly
after this conversation, Mrs. Farris told Berger that she had not given
Booker authorization to settle the case. See id. at 708-09.
On September 26, 1996, the judge entered an order that
dismissed the Farrises' claim. See id. at 709. Shortly thereafter,
Berger received a general release from Booker that contained the
terms of the settlement, butJ.C. Penney did not issue the settlement
check because the Farrises refused to sign the release. Berger also
rejected Booker's efforts to have the settlement proceeds distributed
without the Farrises' signed authorization. Booker then moved to
enforce the settlement on October 7, 1996.
The Farrises
subsequently discharged Booker in November of 1996 and replaced
him with attorney Richard P. Abraham. On January 13, 1997, a
hearing on Booker's motion to enforce the settlement was held, the
judge recused himself, and the case was reassigned.
On January 24, 1997, while Booker's motion was pending,
Abraham filed a motion for relief from the dismissal of the Farrises'
case pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. At an evidentiary hearing on February 5, 1998, Booker, Berger,
and the Farrises provided testimony to the district court. See id. On
April 15, 1998, the district court denied the Farrises' motion and
upheld the settlement based on the apparent authority doctrine. See
id. The court held that Pennsylvania law recognized the apparent
authority doctrine and that Pennsylvania's Supreme Court would
determine that the facts and circumstances of the case warranted
application of the doctrine. See id. The Farrises appealed the district
court's decision. See id.
The issue presented to the Third Circuit for consideration was
whether, in this specific factual context, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would apply the apparent authority doctrine to enforce a
settlement that was agreed to by an attorney who lacked actual
authority to settle the claim. See id. at 707. The court's holding
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not apply the
apparent authority doctrine to enforce the settlement, and,
therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, remanding
the case for further proceedings. See id. at 707-08.
Writing for the majority, Judge Mansmann initially observed that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never utilized the apparent
authority doctrine to enforce a settlement that was entered into by an
attorney who lacked actual authority to do so. See id. at 709. Rather,
the court noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court left the
applicability of the apparent authority doctrine unresolved and had
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suggested that the doctrine could be employed to enforce a
settlement under the appropriate circumstances. See id. The court
also acknowledged; however, that Pennsylvania law generally required
an attorney to have the express authority of his client to settle a case.
See id. (citing Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543, 546-47 (1983)). Judge
Mansmann stated that the only support for the application of the
apparent authority doctrine was provided by a Pennsylvania appellate
court decision, in which the court found that the clients had
consented to their attorney's action. See id. at 709-10 (citing Sustrik v.
Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 149 A.2d 498, 501 (1959)).
Examining Third Circuit precedent, the court discussed Tiernan
v. Devoe, in which Rothman and Sustrik were analyzed. See id. at 710
(discussing Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir. 1991)). The
court explained that the Tiernan court also considered whether
Pennsylvania law permitted a court to enforce a settlement
agreement in the absence of the client's express authority. See id.
Judge Mansmann recounted that the Tiernan court found that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not definitively eliminated the
possibility of using the apparent authority doctrine to enforce a
settlement agreement and might permit the use of the doctrine in an
appropriate case. See id. The court declared that the district court
incorrectly relied on Tiernan in deciding that this case provided the
proper circumstances to depart from the general rule that requires
an attorney to have the actual authority of his clients to settle a case.
See id. at 711. The court stressed that the discussion of apparent
authority in Tiernan was dicta, and that the district court erroneously
relied upon the dicta in predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would apply the apparent authority doctrine to enforce the
settlement agreed to by Booker. See id. Although conceding that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court might invoke the doctrine of apparent
authority under certain factual circumstances, Judge Mansmann
reiterated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not yet done so
and would not do so based on the facts before the court. See id.
Continuing the analysis of case law involving Pennsylvania's
apparent authority doctrine, the court emphasized the factdependent nature of the doctrine and that its application depended
on the client's conduct. See id. In reviewing Edwards v. Born, Inc., the
court focused on the Edwards court's acknowledgment that, under
appropriate circumstances, the strong public policy in favor of
settlements supported application of the apparent authority doctrine
to settlement disputes. See id. (analyzing Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792
F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986)). Additionally, Judge Mansmann emphasized
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that the Edwards court recognized that the critical question in
determining whether apparent authority, had been created was
whether the principal made representations to the third party
regarding the agent's authority. See id. at 711-12. The court also
explained that the Edwards court described apparent authority as an
equitable doctrine that imposes the loss on the individual whose
manifestations have deceived another. See id. at 712.
After concluding the analysis of apparent authority case law, the
court declared that in order for the apparent authority doctrine to
apply, the facts must demonstrate that the plaintiffs directly
communicated with the defense attorney and that the plaintiffs made
representations that would have led defense counsel to conclude that
the plaintiffs' attorney possessed the authority to settle the case. See
id. Judge Mansmann asserted that the district court relied upon two
primary findings in invoking the apparent authority doctrine: the
Farrises were seen meeting with Booker during the settlement
negotiation process and the Farrises remained silent during the incourt proceedings in which the attorneys announced the settlement.
See id. The court opined that the linchpin of the case was the
Farrises' silence and conceded that a client's silence in the face of the
entry of a settlement typically would be a strong indication that the
client authorized the terms of the settlement. See id. Despite these
considerations, the court concluded that the specific facts of the case
refuted the evidentiary power of the Farrises' in-court silence. See id.
In support of the conclusion that the Farrises' in-court silence
did not indicate their authorization of the settlement, the court
highlighted the district court's findings that the in-court proceedings
occurred in a brief period of time and that Mrs. Farris did not
comprehend the events when the settlement and dismissal were
discussed. See id. Furthermore, the court asserted that, ifJ.C. Penney
interpreted the Farrises' silence as authorization of the settlement,
the store was quickly disabused of that belief because Mrs. Farris
immediately expressed her opposition to the settlement to both
Booker and Berger. See id. After citing the general rule that a
principal may promptly repudiate an agent's action, regardless of
apparent authority, the court ruled that J.C. Penney had notice that
the settlement was unauthorized and suggested that such knowledge
promptedJ.C. Penney's refusal to distribute any settlement proceeds.
See id. In finding that the equities of the case favored the Farrises,
Judge Mansmann stressed that Booker had no express authorization
to settle the case, there was a sufficient explanation for the Farrises'
in-court silence, and Mrs. Farris immediately informed all parties that
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she had not authorized the settlement. See id. The court concluded
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not employ the apparent
authority doctrine to enforce this settlement. See id. This conclusion,
Judge Mansmann indicated, was consistent with Third Circuit and
Pennsylvania case law. See id. The judge also emphasized that the
facts of this case were unique and unlikely to be duplicated. See id. at
713.
Turning to the procedure concerning a federal court's
prediction of state law, the court identified four factors that federal
courts consider. See id. The court explained that the four factors
included Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions regarding similar
issues, the case law of Pennsylvania's appellate courts, federal
appellate and trial court decisions that interpreted the state law at
issue, and case law from other jurisdictions concerning the same
issues. See id. Considering these factors, Judge Mansmann predicted
that, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania might, in an
undefined future case, apply the apparent authority doctrine to
enforce a disputed settlement, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would not do so in this case. See id. Therefore, the court reversed the
district court's order that denied the Farrises' motion seeking relief
from the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
See id.
Concurring, Judge Nygaard criticized as unnecessary and
undesirable the court's prediction concerning whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the apparent authority
doctrine in this unique situation. See id. (Nygaard, J., concurring).
Because Mrs. Farris repudiated the settlement agreement, Judge
Nygaard argued that the apparent authority doctrine was inapposite
and that the case should have been viewed as a contemporaneous
repudiation of the settlement agreement. See id. Alternatively, Judge
Nygaard suggested that the court should have certified the apparent
authority question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because it was
an important issue that could determine the outcome of the litigation
and because Pennsylvania law did not supply controlling precedent
upon which the court could rely. See id.
Although
The court's ultimate holding was very narrow.
concluding that the apparent authority doctrine would not apply in
this specific factual context, the court conceded that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court might choose to enforce the doctrine under an
appropriate set of facts. In that sense, the court's ruling creates some
uncertainty because the apparent authority doctrine still is subject to
disparate interpretation between a federal court predicting the
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court's actions and actions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself. This possibility lends support to
Judge Nygaard's opinion that the court should have certified the
issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
However, the court did not adopt Judge Nygaard's position,
possibly because the court viewed the facts of this case as very unusual
and because the issue of apparent authority in the settlement context
is not likely to recur frequently. Overall, the opinion provides strong
encouragement for attorneys to obtain the express authorization of
their clients before settling a case.
Furthermore, Farris both
reinforces the well-established principle that attorneys must comply
with their client's clear wishes and provides a degree of protection to
clients whose instructions are not respected by their attorneys.
Brian Patrick Sharkey

